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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and 
and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN E. PAPANIKOLAS, GUS 
E. PAPANIKOLAS and NICK 
E. PAPANIKOLAS, dba 
MAGNA INVESTMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
a partnership, 
Defendants, Respondents 
and Cross-Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10,657 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Condemnation action to acquire real property 
owned by defendants in the vicinity of 4500 South 
and 200 West Streets in Salt Lake County, Utah 
for use in the construction of a public highway faci-
lity known as 45th South from U.S. 91 to I-15. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
By written Stipulation the parties agreed upon 
the sum of $50,000.00 (which includes all interest, 
costs, etc.) as the amount of compensation to be 
1 
paid defendants for the lands, buildings and im-
provements taken and for the damages to the re-
mainder of defendants' property not taken, exclud-
ing only certain i terns of property claimed by de-
fendants to be fixtures and compensable. Therefore, 
the only issues tried in the lower court, sitting with-
out a jury, were 
1. Whether certain items of defendants' 
property were fixtures and, if so, 
2. Whether defendants were entitled to 
compensation therefor, either as a part of the 
real property taken or as a damage to the 
remainder of defendants' real property not 
taken. 
The trial court found that all of the items of 
property in issue were fixtures and as such were a 
permanent part of the real property upon which 
they were situated. (R. 65). Detailed Findings Of 
Fact were made and entered by the trial court as 
to each i tern of property in issue ( R. 67-7 4, incl.). 
It concluded that defendants were entitled to com-
pensation for all such items of property situated 
within the area taken, less the salvage value of those 
items of property or parts thereof removed by de-
fendants from the area taken (R. 7 4-75). It further 
concluded that defendants were not entitled to com-
pensation for the items of property situated out-
side the area taken because the law does not speci-
fically provide for compensation therefor, and in 
2 
any event any damage thereto was speculative and 
indefinite as to the nature, extent and amount 
thereof ( R. 7 5) . 
The trial court then awarded judgment to de-
fendants in the sum of $103,731.00, of which 
$53,731.00 was awarded as compensation for the 
items of property situated within the area taken 
after deducting therefrom the salvage value of those 
items or parts thereof removed by defendants from 
the area taken (R. 76-77). The sum of $50,000.00 
has been paid to defendants and a partial satisfac-
tion of the judgment in that amount has been filed 
and entered (R. 78-79). Payment of the remaining 
sum of $53,731.00 has been withheld pending this 
appeal. Thereupon plaintiff filed its Notice Of 
Appeal (R. 80) and defendants have cross-appealed 
(R. 88-89). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plain tiff seeks reversal of that portion of the 
judgment awarding the defendants the sum of 
$53, 731.00 for the items of property found to be 
fixtures, and seeks judgment in its favor as a mat-
ter of law or, that failing, for a modification of the 
judgment to exclude therefrom the sum of $2,542.00 
awarded to defendants for certain items of proper-
ty which as a matter of law are not fixtures and 
are non-compensable. 
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STATEMENT OF FACT 
Defendants owned a tract of land fronting on 
the then existing 4500 South Street on the north 
side thereof between West Temple and 200 West 
Streets in Salt Lake County, upon which there were 
situated a complex of buildings containing mach-
inery, equipment and facilities used by defendants 
in conducting the business of precutting and pre-
fabricating house components used in the construc-
tion of houses (Exh. A-1 attached to Complaint, Exh. 
D-1, Tr. 9, 11, 12). On March 20, 1963 plaintiff 
filed this action to condemn in fee, and for a tem-
porary easement, a part of defendants' real prop-
erty for the construction of a public highway faci-
lity known generally as 45th South from U.S. 91 
to I-15 (Complaint and attached Exh. A-2, R. 1-8 
incl.). Service of process on these defendants was 
on March 22, 1963, being the date of taking (R. 16, 
Tr. 2). The real property taken comprised the south-
ern portion of the defendants' property upon which 
were situated all of defendants' buildings except 
that defendants' mill component building was sev-
ered by the "take" line. The south 43 feet of the 
mill component building was located within the 
area taken and the north 93 feet thereof was located 
outside of the area taken (Exh. D-1). The complex 
of buildings housed the i terns of property in dis-
pute (Exh. D-1). 
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On March 27, 1963 an Order Of Immediate Oc-
cupancy of the property condemned was entered by 
the lower court (R. 17-18). Thereafter demolition 
crews razed the buildings situated within the area 
taken, although prior thereto some of the items of 
property in dispute, or parts thereof, were removed 
therefrom by defendants. The remainder of the 
mill component building was then enclosed on the 
south side by constructing a completely new wall 
just north of the "take" line. 
To facilitate the trial of this case and to nar-
row the issues to be tried, the parties stipulated 
( R. 60-64, incl.) as follows: 
1. The sum of $50,000.00 (which 
includes all interest and costs, etc.) as the 
amount of compensation to be paid defen-
dants for their lands, buildings and improve-
ments taken and for the damages to the re-
mainder of the defendants' property not tak-
en, excluding therefrom all of the defendants' 
property and property right to certain articles 
set forth in Exhibits "A" and "D" attached 
to defendants' answers dated April 22, 1966 
to plaintiff's Interrogatories dated March 30, 
1966 on file herein (R. 43-54, incl., 58-59). 
2. The only remaining issues to be tried 
to the court, sitting without a jury, were 
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(a) whether the i terns of property 
set forth in said Exhibit "A" and Ex-
hibit "D" were fixtures, and, if so, 
(b) whether defendants are en-
titled to compensation therefor either as 
a part of the real property taken as to 
the items set forth in said Exhibit "A" 
or as a damage to the remainder of de-
fendants' real property not taken as to 
the items set forth in said Exhibit "D". 
3. The value stated as to each item set 
forth in said Exhibit "A", all being within 
the area taken ( Exh. "B" attached to de-
fendants' answer to Interrogatories, R. 55) 
was the fair market value as of March 22, 
1963 thereof (R. 63, Tr. 96) and if found to 
be compensable would enhance the value of 
the realty in such amounts (Tr. 95). 
4. That as to Items 34, 37, 39 and 40 
set forth in said Exhibit "D" (not within the 
area taken) the respective amounts set forth 
therein are the reasonable cost of relocation 
(Tr.5). 
As to all items in dispute located within the 
area taken as set forth in said Exhibit "A" (R. 43-
54, incl.). defendants were put to their proof as to 
whether such items were fixtures and, if so, whether 
compensable in this action. As to all items in dis-
pute located outside of the area taken as set forth 
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in said Exhibit "D" (R. 58-59), defendants were 
put to their proof as to whether such items were 
fixtures, whether such items had been "damaged" 
and the amount of damages, if any, thereto. 
The trial court found that all of those items of 
property in dispute as set forth in said Exhibit "A" 
( R. 43-54, incl.) were physically attached and an-
nexed to the realty taken (R. 67-71 incl.); that the 
manner in which all of such items were so attached 
and annexed to the realty taken and the manner in 
which the same were adapted to the buildings to 
which they were attached was such that the items 
were intended to be and did become a permanent 
part of the realty; that the realty was enhanced 
thereby; that none of the items, except for the parts 
thereof removed by defendants, could be removed 
without substantial damage to the buildings to which 
such items were attached or without substantial 
damage to the item itself; and that by reason there-
of all such items were fixtures (R. 71-72). Sub-
stantially the same findings were made as to the 
items of property in dispute as set forth in Exhibit 
"D" (R. 58-59) located within the remainder of 
the mill component building not taken by plaintiff 
(R. 73-7 4). 
The trial court further found that fourteen sep-
arate items comprising a component part or the 
whole of Items Nos. 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 
21, 22, 23, 24 and 29 set forth in Exhibit "A" were 
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removed by defendants from the area taken, hav· 
ing a salvage value of $2,665.00 (R. 72). It then 
found that the reasonable value of the electrical 
system and pneumatic power system located in the 
remainder of the mill component building not taken 
was $1,335.00 (R. 72-73). It then deducted the 
salvage value of the items or components removed 
( $2,665.00) and the reasonable value of that por-
tion of the electrical and pneumatic systems not 
taken ( $1,335.00), i.e. $4,000.00, from the total 
sum of $57,731.00 and awarded defendants the sum 
of $53,731.00 as compensation for the items of prop-
erty within the area taken (R. 75, 77). 
The trial court then found that the items of 
property set forth in said Exhibit "D" (R. 58-59) 
annexed and attached to the remainder of the mill 
component building not taken had not been dam-
aged by reason of the taking in this case ( R. 7 4) 
and concluded that no damages should be awarded 
to defendants therefor ( R. 7 5) . 
ARGUMENT 
Except for the following items, to-wit: 
Item No. 9-Swing cut saw (R. 69) 
Item No. 11-Compressor and circulator 
(R. 69) 
Item No. 13-Molding cut-off saw ( R. 69) 
Item No. 17-Self-feed variable speed rip 
saw (R. 70) 
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Item No. 20-Drill Press (R. 70) 
Item No. 22-Continuous feed belt sander 
(R. 70) 
Item No. 29-6 inch jointer ( R. 71) 
plaintiff does not contest the Findings Of Fact of 
the trial court since plaintiff concedes that, with 
the exceptions noted, the evidence supports the same. 
Plaintiff does, however, contest the compensability 
in condemnation of all of the items in dispute. 
As to the i terns excepted and noted above, plain-
tiff contests the Findings Of Fact thereon and con-
tends that by reason of their removal such are not 
fixtures as a matter of law and likewise are not 
compensable in condemnation. 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS JUDGMENT 
AWARDING COMPENSATION TO DEFENDANTS FOR 
THE ITEMS OF PROPERTY IN DISPUTE UNDER ITS 
FINDINGS THAT SUCH WERE FIXTURES AND A 
PERMANENT PART OF THE REALTY TAKEN BY 
PLAINTIFF IN THE CONDEMN A TI ON OF DEFEND-
ANTS' PREMISES. 
The basis of plaintiff's argument is two-fold: 
1. Section 78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated 
1.953 does not expressly provide for compensation to 
be paid for fixtures in a condemnation action, and 
2. If fixtures are compensable, the trial court 
e1Ted as a matter of law in finding that certain 
items removed by defendants from the condemned 
premises were fixtures, and likewise erred as a 
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matter of law in awarding any compensation there-
for. 
As to ( 1), the compensability for fixtures in 
condemnation cases has not been expressly decided 
by this court and the issue here presented is one of 
first impression in Utah so far as our research 
discloses. Accordingly, we are here seeking prece-
dent not only to settle the issue as to the instant 
case but to adopt standards and establish guide line 
from which condemnors and condemnees alike might 
ascertain what property rights must be compensat-
ed for in property known to the law as fixtures. 
It is elementary that the power of eminent do-
main, being an inherent attribute of sovereignty, 
exists in absolute and unlimited form. Nichols on 
Eminent Domain, Volume 1, Section 1.13 ( 4), page 
12; Section 1.14, 1.14(2), pages 13-16, inclusive; 
Section 1.3, page 50. Article I, Section 22, Constitu-
tion of Utah is but a limitation upon the power 
already in existence which would otherwise be un-
limited. Nichols on Eminent Domain, Volume 1, 
Section 1.3, pages 50-51. With such limitation hav-
ing been imposed by our State Constitution it is 
settled law that when private property is taken by 
eminent domain the owner of the property is con-
stitutionally entitled to compensation therefor. Nich-
ols on Eminent Domain, Volume 3, Section 8.102), 
page 6 and cases cited therein, including State v. 
Noble, 6 Utah (2d) 40, 305 Pac. (2d) 495 (1957). 
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However, compensation is limited to those elements 
expressly enumerated in Section 78-34-10, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. Likewise compensation must be 
assessed in the manner therein provided for. South-
ern Pacific Company v. Arthur, 10 Utah (2d) 306, 
352 Pac. ( 2d) 693 ( 1960). Applicable here is sub-
division ( 1) thereof, to-wit: 
" ( 1) The value of the property sought 
to be condemned and all improvements there-
on appertaining to the realty, and of each 
and every separate estate or interest therein; 
and if it consists of different parcels, the 
value of each parcel and of each estate or 
interest therein shall be separately assessed." 
In construing the foregoing statute in Utah 
Road Commission v. Hansen, 14 Utah (2d) 305, 
383 Pac. ( 2d) 917 ( 1963) this court clearly de-
cided that the foregoing statute does not allow com-
pensation for personal property situated upon the 
property taken. Thus, on page 308 of the Utah Re-
ports it is noted that the foregoing statute 
" ... speaks in terms of real property and 
the damage to be awarded for its taking, but 
contains no express wording construable as 
allowing recovery for the cost of removing or 
disposing of personal property from the pre-
mises condemned. The question of its dispo-
sition has been before the courts many times 
and the majority view seems to be that, in-
asmuch as the condemnor takes only the real-
ty, and acquires no interest in the personalty, 
it is the responsibility of the condemnee as 
owner to take care of his personal property 
11 
if he desires to preserve it; and that conse-
quently the expenses in connection with its re-
moval or sale are not proper to be considered 
as a separate element of damages to be charg-
ed against the condemnor for the taking of 
real property." 
The crux of the matter is whether fixtures are non 
compensable because not expressly provided for un-
der Section 78-84-10, Utah Code Annotated 1.958 
and, therefore, excluded under the rationale of Utah 
Road Cornmission v. Hansen, supra, applicable to 
personal property or whether fixtures come within 
the description of "improvements thereon apper-
taining to the realty". We have been unable to find 
any Utah case decisive on this point. Looking to 
other jurisdictions, our research discloses that the 
following states have specifically allowed compen-
sation for fixtures in condemnation cases, to-wit: 
Arkansas - Kansas City S.R. Co. v. An-
derson, 113 S.W. 1030 (1908); 
California - Los Angeles v. Klinker, 25 
Pac. (2d) 826 (1933); 
Connecticut - Jones v. New Haven Re-
developnient Agency, 146 A. (2d) 921 
(1958); 
Delaware - Roffman v. Wilrnington 
Housing A iithority, 179 A. ( 2d) 99 ( 1962) ; 
Georgia - Pause v. Atlanta, 26 S.E. 489 
(1895); 
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Illinois - Chicago S.F. & C.R. Co. v. 
Ward, 18 N.E. 828, 21 N.E. 562 (1889); 
Indiana - White v. Cincinnati R & MR 
Co., 71N.E.276 (1904); 
Kansas - Hoy v. Kansas Turnpike 
Authority, 334 P. (2d) 315 (1959); 
Louisiana - State v. Allen, 135 S. (2d) 
350 (1961); 
Maryland - Baltimore v. Himmel, 107 
Atl. 522 ( 1919) ; 
Massachusetts - Williams v. Com., 47 
N.E. 115 (1897); 
Michigan - In re Slum Clearance, 52 
N.W. (2d) 195 (1952); 
Missouri - State v. Dockery, 300 S.W. 
(2d) 450 (1957); 
Montana - State v. Peterson, 328 P. 
(2d) 617 ( 1958); 
New Jersey - State v. Gallant, 202 Atl. 
(2d) 401 (1964); 
New Hampshire - Edgcomb Steel of 
New England v. State, 131 A. (2d) 70 (1957) 
(Dictum); 
New York - Re Psychopathic Pavilion, 
230 N.Y. Supp. 411 (1928); and Jackson v. 
State, 106 N.E. 758 (1914); 
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Ohio - State v. DeLay, 181 N.E. (2d) 
706 (1959); 
Oklahoma - Wright v. State, 230 Pac. 
(2d) 462 (1951); 
Oregon - State v. Superbilt Mfg. Co., 
281Pac. (2d) 707 (1955); 
Pennsylvania - Diamond Mills Emery 
Company v. Philadelphia, 22 Pa. Co. Ct. 9 
(1894); 
Tennessee - Yates & D. Co. v. Memphis, 
194 s.w. 903. 
Likewise Nichols on Eminent Domain states the rule 
as a1lowing compensation for fixtures in condemna-
tion cases. Volume 2, Section 5.83, 5.81 (11), pages 
326-332, inclusive; Volume 4, Sections 13.12, 
13.12(1) and 13.12(2), pages 364-368, inclusive. 
In reaching the above result most of the states 
have applied the general three-way test for deter-
mining whether the items in question are fixtures, 
i.e. ( 1) the manner in which the item is attached 
or annexed to the realty, (2) whether the item is 
adaptable to the particular use of the realty and 
(3) the intention of the annexor to make the item 
a permanent part of the realty. Utah has applied 
the same three-way test in non condemnation cases. 
Heiselt Construction Company v. Garff, 
119 Utah 164, 225 Pac. (2d) 720 (1950); 
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Saunders v. Kidman, 75 Utah 303, 284 
Pac. 997 ( 1930) ; 
Workman v. Henrie, 71 Utah 400, 266 
Pac. 1033 (1928); 
Moe v. Millard County School District, 
54Utah144, 179 Pac. 980 (1919); 
Calder's Park Company v. Corless, 51 
Utah 586, 172 Pac. 310 ( 1918) ; 
Miller v. Johnson, 43 Utah 468, 134 Pac. 
1017 ( 1913) ; 
Couch v. Welsh, 24 Utah 36, 66 Pac. 600 
(1901); 
4 
Podlech v. Phelan, 13 Utah 333, 44 Pac. 
838 (1896). "' ' 
Insofar as our le search discloses, none of our 
sister states which have passed on the question of 
compensability of fixtures in condemnation cases 
has denied compensation. Although the decisions of 
our sister states are pursuasive, they are not con-
trolling. Compensability or non-compensability of 
fixtures in condemnation cases in Utah is still open 
for decision. Without belaboring the point, we ask 
this court for a clear-cut decision thereon such that 
condemnors and condemnees alike will know what 
property rights, if any, must be compensated for 
in property known to the law as fixtures. 
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Accordingly, if this court adopts the view that 
fixtures are not compensable in condemnation cases 
that should end this matter and the judgment of the 
trial court awarding defendants the sum of $53,-
731.00 must be reversed. If, however, this court 
adopts the view that fixtures are compensable then, 
as noted ear lier under ( 2) above, the trial court 
erred as a matter of law in finding that certain of 
the items removed by defendants from the condemn-
ed premises were fixtures and likewise erred as a 
matter of law in awarding any compensation there-
for. Specifically the items about which the plaintiff 
complains are as fallows: 
Item No. 9 - swing cut saw - located 
in building "C" (Exh. D-1). It was bolted to 
the wall (Tr. 28) but could be removed and 
put some other place (Tr. 29), and was in 
fact removed by simply taking off the bolts 
and cover (Tr. 104). The fair market value 
was fixed at $235.00 (R. 69) and its "salv-
age" value was fixed at $100.00 (R. 72) or 
a difference of $135.00. 
Item No. 11 - compressor and circulator 
located within the paint spray room of 
building "P" ( Exh.D-1). The circulator was 
"attached" to the building (Tr. 30), compris-
ing two heaters bolted to the wall (Tr. 108) 
and "pots" containing lacquers and thinners 
(Tr. 105) which were removed from the paint 
16 
area (Tr. 105, 108). The fair market value 
thereof was $690.00 (Tr. 105) and the trial 
court fixed its "salvage" value at $300.00 
(R. 72) or a difference of $390.00. 
Item No. 13 - Cut off saw - attached 
to building "M" ( Exhs. D-1, D-3). It was bolt-
ed to the wall (Tr. 32) and was removed 
(Tr. 95, 110). Its fair market value was 
fixed at $232.00 (R. 69) and its "salvage" 
value was fixed at $100.00 (R. 72) or a dif-
ference of $132.00. 
Item No. 17 - Self feed variable speed 
rip saw - located in component mill build-
ing (Exhs. D-1, D-4). It was bolted to a spe-
cial base under the floor (Tr. 38) but was 
removed and remounted in back of the com-
ponent mill building (Tr. 113). Its fair mar-
ket value was fixed at $1,010.00 (R. 70) and 
its "salvage" value was fixed at $400.00 (R. 
72) or a difference of $610.00. 
Item No. 20 - drill press - located in com-
ponent mill building (Exhs. D-1, D-7). It 
was bolted to the wall and to the floor (Tr. 
44) and was removed (Tr. 96). Its fair mar-
ket value was fixed at $250.00 (R. 70) and 
its "salvage' value was fixed at $125.00 (R. 
72) or a difference of $125.00. 
Item No. 22 - continuous feed belt sander 
- located in component mill building (Exh. 
17 
D-1). It was bolted to the floor (Tr. 46) and 
was removed (Tr. 96). Its fair market value 
was fixed at $1,400.00 (R. 70) and its "salv-
age" value was fixed at $350.00 (R. 72) or a 
difference of $1,050.00. 
Item No. 29 - 6 inch jointer - located 
in component mill building ( Exh. D-1). It 
weighed about 200 pounds and was bolted to 
the floor for the purpose of steadying it and 
was removed (Tr. 124). Its fair market value 
was fixed at $350.00 (R. 71) and its "salv-
age" value was fixed at $250.00 (R. 72) or 
a difference of $100.00. 
Summarizing the above, the fair market value, 
"salvage" value and difference between them are as 
follows: 
Fair Market "Salvage" 
Value Value Difference 
Item No. 9 $ 235.00 $ 100.00 $ 135.00 
Item No. 11 690.00 300.00 390.00 
Item No. 13 232.00 100.00 132.00 
Item No. 17 1,010.00 400.00 610.00 
Item No. 20 250.00 125.00 125.00 
Item No. 22 1,400.00 350.00 1,050.00 
Item No. 29 350.00 250.00 100.00 
$4,167.00 $1,625.00 $2,542.00 
As to the above, the trial court found that 
none of the items numbered 1 through 31 inclusive 
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" ... except for the parts thereof which were 
?'enwved and salvaged by defendants as here-
mafter set forth, could be removed without 
~ubstantial damage to the building to which 
it was attached or without substantial dam-
age to the item itself; ... " (R. 71-72) (Un-
derscoring ours) 
Thus the trial court found in effect that each of 
the items listed above could be removed without sub-
stantial damage to the item itself. That being so, 
we submit that it was error for the trial court to 
award any compensation to defendants for any of 
such items. 
In a condemnation proceeding the mode of en-
nexation becomes the most important criteria of the 
general three-way fixture test, i.e. ( 1) annexation, 
( 2) adaption and ( 3) in ten ti on. It is the mode of 
annexation which determines whether such items 
constitute "improvements thereon appertaining to 
the realty" and, therefore, compensable under Sec-
tion 78-34-10(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953. Ad-
mittedly the criteria of intention plays the dominant 
role in non-condemnation actions arising under our 
lien statutes or in mortgagor-mortgagee, lessor-
lessee and vendor-vendee transactions for there the 
relationships are contractual. Not so in condemna-
tion proceedings. Here the parties are strangers. 
And so the controlling factor is whether the annex-
ation is such that the item can be removed without 
substantial injury to the item itself and included, 
but of lesser importance, whether removal will re-
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sult in substantial injury to the realty. This is basic-
ally the test of compensability adopted in the Dis-
trict of Columbia and we submit the more realistic 
test. 
The landmark case is Futrovsky v. United 
States, 66 Fed. (2d) 215 (C.A.D.C. 1933) where 
that court held that machinery, some of which was 
designed to fit the building, was bolted to the floor 
but could have been removed without injury to the 
machinery or to the building, except to perhaps de-
face the concrete floor, were not compensable in a 
condemnation proceeding. The court concluded that 
such items of machinery were not fixtures because 
such could be removed without substantial injury 
to either the realty or to the items themselves and 
because they were placed in the building as a neces-
sity of the business carried on there and not as an 
improvement to the real estate. This rule was fol-
lowed in Potomac Electric Power Company v. United 
States, 85 Fed. (2d) 243 (C.A.D.C. 1936). 
The rationale of the foregoing test was dis-
cussed in 8 Southern California Law Review in a 
note concerning the case of City of Los Angeles v. 
The Times-Mirror Company, 25 Pac. (2d) 828 
( 1933) where the city was held liable for the value 
of the presses in the condemned building. It was 
stated on page 56 of the note as fallows: 
" ... It might be argued that the City was 
rightfully compelled to pay for the building 
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as well as for the land in condemnation pro-
ceedings, but that the municipality should 
not have been compelled to become the pur-
chaser of the presses and like equipment when 
such could have been removed by the appellant 
newspaper company and used at a new loca-
tion. Such a situation can be remedied quite 
readily by the application of a distinct rule 
in the case of condemnation proceedings by 
governmental bodies. It is submitted that the 
rule applied in the recent case of Futrovsky 
v. United States would be an adequate rem-
edy. That case provides that in federal con-
demnation proceedings, where substantial in-
jury will not be affected by removal of fix-
tures, they remain personalty and need not 
be taken as part of the realty regarding li-
ability therefor. Although subject to criticism, 
a similar rule applied by all governmental 
bodies would prevent such a result as in the 
instant case." 
Ostensibly the fore going test was adopted by the 
trial court as shown by its Findings. However, it 
failed to apply the same to the seven items about 
which plaintiff complains. 
We submit that the condemnor should not be 
forced to purchase items of machinery and equip-
ment which could be readily removed to a new site 
for further use by the condemnee. In harmony 
therewith is Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 
5.83, where on page 328 it is stated: 
"There is no liability for machinery or 
other fixtures attached only by screws or 
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which can otherwise be readily removed, at 
least in jurisdictions which allow no recovery 
for the cost of removing personal property." 
Cases cited in support thereof are: Jackson v. State, 
145 N.Y. Supp. 131; New York Central, etc. R.R. 
Co. v. Albany Steam Trap Company, 146 N.Y. Supp. 
674; and City of Huron v. Jelgerhuis (N.D.), 97 
N.W. (2d) 314. 
No more reason exists for imposing an obliga-
tion to purchase such items on the condemnor than 
to require it to purchase items of personal property 
situated upon the condemned premises. The latter 
was clearly rejected by this court in Utah Road Com-
mission v. Hansen, 14 Utah (2d) 305, 383 Pac. 
(2d) 917 (1963). 
The items in question had their place upon the 
condemned premises for the purpose of carrying 
out defendants' business of construction of houses. 
The mere fact that defendants removed the items in 
question demonstrates that such items were mobile 
in nature and adaptable to use at other locations. 
The removal of such i terns in and of itself is evidence 
that such were not fixtures and likewise were non 
compensable. It would be anomolous indeed to award 
compensation to a businessman-owner for every 
piece of equipment and machinery which was mere-
ly an integral part of his business, since the con-
demnor would in truth be paying for the owner's 
business which could be transferred to another loca-
tion. 
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For the trial court to give the plaintiff a credit 
for the "salvage" value thereof does not remedy 
the situation. On the contrary, plaintiff should not 
be required to pay for such items at all. Accord-
ingly, the judgment must be modified to reduce the 
award to defendants by the amount of $2,542.00, 
thereby allowing no compensation for I terns Nos. 
9, 11, 13, 17, 20, 22 and 29 described above. 
CONCLUSION 
Compensability of fixtures in condemnation 
proceedings has not been expressly decided by this 
Court. All of our sister states which have passed 
on this point have held fixtures to be compensable 
and none have denied compensation. 
Determinative of this issue in Utah is whether 
fixtures come within the description of "improve-
ments thereon appertaining to the reality" and thus 
compensable under Section 78-34-10(1), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. Although the decisions of our sister 
states are persuasive, they are not controlling and 
the issue is still open for decision in Utah. Accord-
ingly, we are here seeking precedent and ask this 
Court for a clear-cut decision thereon, not only to 
settle the issue in this case but to adopt standards 
and establish guide lines such that condemnors and 
condemnees alike will know what property rights, 
if any, must be compensated for in property known 
to the law as fixtures. 
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If this Court adopts the view that fixtures are 
not compensable in condemnation proceedings that 
will end this matter and the judgment of the trial 
court awarding defendants the sum of $53,731.00 
must be reversed. If, however, this Court adopts 
the view that fixtures are compensable then we urge 
that the requisite mode of annexation must be such 
that removal of the item will cause substantial dam-
age to the item itself and to the realty to which it 
was attached. Ostensibly this was the test adopted 
by the trial court. However, it failed to apply such 
test to seven of the items removed by defendants, 
which it in effect found could be removed without 
substantial damage to the item itself or to the realty, 
and awarded compensation for their full fair mar-
ket values respectively less a credit for their respec-
tive "salvage" values. In so doing the trial court 
erred and the judgment must be modified to re-
duce the amount of the award by the sum of 
$2,542.00, being the net amount awarded to de-
fendants for the seven items about which plaintiff 
complains. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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